Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 28

Number 2

Article 6

Winter 1984

Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Eclipse of Private Worlds
Francis A. Allen
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
Francis A. Allen, Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Eclipse of Private Worlds, 28 Law Quadrangle (formerly Law
Quad Notes) - (1984).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol28/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

The persisting populist and egalitarian
tendencies in American
society have often
weakened defense of the
privacy value, the concept of a
protected private world being seen
at times as elitist and at others
sinister.

I
T

he concept of the private world is obviously central to the liberal society, and support for the
value predates the recent centuries of the modern era
since that society came into being. Deep countercurrents emerged early in the history of Western culture,
too, and continue strong in modern America. The
society envisioned in Plato's Republic is one in which
the good life is conducted in the public world almost
to the exclusion of the private. The persisting populist and egalitarian tendencies in American society
have often weakened defense of the privacy value,
the concept of a protected private world being seen at
times as elitist and at others sinister.
In the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate world, new
and exotic manifestations of populist attitudes have
burgeoned, many of which express hostility to the
private world. Characteristic phenomena of the present and recent past include the rise of investigative
journalism under the banner of "the people's right to
know," the flourishing of the gossip industry, "sunshine" laws, the encounter movement. Some social
analysts have found little more in the defense of the
private world than a pathological effort to escape
legitimate social obligations and involvements.
Indeed, it is not possible to give assurances that privacy will not often be used for ignoble and selfish
ends, just as other great privileges such as freedom of
speech or of economic enterprise may be employed
in destructive and inhumane activity. These concessions, however, do not detract from the assertion that
enhancement of the quality of the public life, if it
occurs, will result, not from the weakening, but the
strengthening of the private worlds, in which friendship, compassion, and the other life-enhancing values
are first and most strongly experienced.
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It should not be overlooked that the political alienation of many persons in American society, in
particular many members of the intelligentsia, has
resulted from a political style, populist in origin, that
reveals small regard for personal privacy and at times
results in gross assaults upon the private worlds of
individuals. The McCarthy era, to cite only one series
of events, confirmed the anti-political biases of many
intellectuals, attitudes founded on over a century of
American experience. There is ample reason to suppose that the losses in personal autonomy that
underlie alienation are exacerbated by the invasions
of the private world characteristic of modem technological society.
Nineteen Eighty-Four's affirmation of the importance
of the private world to human interests and humane
values eases the burden of its modern defenders. It
is, however, one thing to affirm, quite another to
define and protect. These latter difficulties reveal
themselves most clearly in the legal experience, and
consulting that history may contribute to their understanding. The private world encompasses some of
the most basic of human aspirations; inevitably such
aspirations are reflected in jurisprudential reflections
and in the definitions of legal rights. Yet the "legalization" of the private world gives rise to perplexing
problems, and its results are often tentative and
unsatisfactory.
The difficulties are in the first instance conceptual
in nature. Privacy has proved to be a mercurial idea,
one difficult to capture within the confines of a legal
formula. Not all privacy claims are of the same kind
or of similar importance. They arise in extraordinary
profusion, and they tend to adopt the coloration of
the particular context from which they arise. The
rights of privacy visualized in the law of torts to protect individuals from unwelcome public exposure by
other private persons are significantly different from
the constitutional right against compelled inquiry
by the state or against the unsanctioned invasion of
homes or papers by police functionaries. The right of
a woman to determine when or if she is to bear a
child is different from either.
Although the privacy value is the subject of considerable legal attention, no completely satisfactory
analytical structure defining and supporting the various privacy interests has to date emerged. In such
a situation the disorderly conduct of concepts can be
anticipated, and that expectation is amply realized
in much of the judicial literature. Some judges have
promoted a bold and imperialistic expansion of the
privacy concept. Thus, in the well-known case of
Griswold v. Connecticut Justice Douglas for the Court
invalidated a state statute that provided criminal penalties for "Any person who uses any drug ... or
instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception." 1 The interest that the state statute was
said to have offended was a constitutional right of
privacy. And where does the right come from? It is
not to be found in the express language of the Con-

stitution, said Justice Douglas; the right has its
origins in "emanations" from the "periphery" of several Bill of Rights provisions. 2 But why the privacy
rationale? The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state
to deny "liberty" without due process of law. The
injury done by the statute might be thought to fit
comfortably into that historical category, but the category had been engulfed in all too much history.
"Substantive due process" doctrines were employed
by the old Court at the turn of the century to invalidate such legislation as that limiting the hours of
labor of workmen, and the present majority was
unwilling to revive doctrines tainted by such uses in
the past.
Since the case of Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923, the
Supreme Court has announced a small number of
decisions, including those in the abortion cases, 3 that
are said to delineate a sphere of interests, denominated privacy concerns, in such areas as marriage,
procreation, and child rearing. The cases are, as one
commentator observed, "a rag-tag lot." Many of them
appear to speak principally to values other than those
now attributed to them. How broadly or narrowly
the constitutional right of privacy is to be drawn in
the future , and by what processes of reasoning such
questions are to be resolved or even thought about,
remain obscure. These efforts of the Court to give
constitutional definition to the privacy interest are
not the products of principled decision making, and
whatever social benefits they confer do not include
that of strengthening the rule of law.
A very different and perhaps equally dubious reaction to the privacy value can be found in the
reductionist positions taken by other courts and by
some legal commentators. These writers and judges,
far from urging an amorphous inflation of the privacy
concept, believe it in most situations to be extraneous
and unnecessary. Typically, it is said, questions of
privacy are associated with other interests and values-interests in reputation, in the protection of
property from trespass or appropriation, and the like.
Proper resolution of such disputes is facilitated by
proceeding directly to the consideration of. such interests unencumbered by reference to the privacy
concept.
It may be doubted, however, that such a rigorous
purging of privacy from the vocabulary of the law
best serves our long-term interests. It is clear that in
much modern discourse, both within and outside the
legal arena, there is reluctance to confront fundamental issues of the private world and that the shyness
is often displayed even when the privacy concern is
real and in need of identification and consideration.
The tendency to evade basic issues may well be
encouraged by the absence of an established conceptual system persuasively and usefully articulating
the privacy values. Thus, in the debates that have
arisen from time to time in the last two decades concerning the use of lie detectors in the hiring practices
of public and private employers, discussion tends to

The values of the
private world are
not our only
values, and the
defense of that world consists largely
in struggles over where boundaries
dividing the private from the public
and the social are to be drawn.
Unhappily there is no calculus that
unfailingly locates the borders of
these realms in positions
guaranteeing optimum social
and personal advantages.
wind down in questions about the technical reliability of the polygraph, leaving fundamental concerns of
human dignity unidentified and unanalyzed. The
use of so-called rehabilitative techniques on persons
convicted of crime or suffering from mental disorder,
especially such procedures as psychosurgery, aversive
conditioning, and extreme drug therapies, tend to be
opposed, if opposed at all, on grounds that they do
not work, are unreliable, or produce unfortunate side
effects. Remaining unstated and unconsidered are
questions of the propriety, in a liberal society, of the
government's manipulation of human beings by penetrating or engulfing their conscious defenses.
The difficulties encountered in the legal defense of
the private world, however, are not confined to problems of definition and articulation, important as these
matters are to the life of the law. Even more significant is the circumstance that the claims of the private
realm are by their nature contingent rather than absolute. In a famous dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis
referred to a "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of the rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 4
Yet clearly no individual can be both in society and
also wholly immune to its demands. The values of
the private world are not our only values, and the
defense of that world consists largely in struggles
over where boundaries dividing the private from the
public and the social are to be drawn. Unhappily
there is no calculus that unfailingly locates the borders of these realms in positions guaranteeing
optimum social and personal advantages. In a liberal
state, unlike Oceania, attacks on the private realm are
ordinarily launched by those who, often sincerely,
29

In a period of
extreme public
sensitivity to
crime like the present, many in the
community tend to regard the
Fourth Amendment simply as a
refuge for f elans.
profess attachment to the privacy value, but who in
the particular instance urge that a larger value is
gained by a constriction of the private world.
There is, of course, nothing surprising in this. The
fashioning of all basic legal and constitutional
immunities involves problems of balancing interests
and values (although some have dreamed that First
Amendment rights can be defined as absolute). Seeking equilibrium between centrifugal and centripetal
tendencies is the constant preoccupation of liberal
societies. Yet if the problems of maintaining the values of the private world are not unique in this
respect, their defenders are, nevertheless, often in
positions of comparative disadvantage. In a world of
conflicting values and interests the most important
question may often be, Who has the burden of persuasion? It might be thought that, given the
importance of the private world to the most fundamental liberal values, the onus of proof should be
placed on those who seek to justify invasions of the
private realm on the ground that larger social interests are being served. In many areas of American law
and policy precisely the opposite presumption is
being applied.
An especially stem test of our commitment to privacy values is to be found in the area of criminal law
enforcement. Before the decision of the abortion cases
and their antecedents, a lawyer speaking of "the right
to privacy" was most likely referring to the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The contingent nature of
those rights is made apparent in the language of the
amendment itself. It is only "unreasonable" searches
and seizures that are forbidden. Privacy may be
invaded and papers and other evidence seized, provided formalities of justification have been satisfied
and the official conduct does not transgress the scope
of the authorization. Nevertheless, the bulwark of
the Fourth Amendment is constantly beseiged by
claims of social interest and expediency, and for constriction of the rights it protects.
The first and perhaps most important reason for
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this is that Fourth Amendment privacy rights are
most often asserted by persons who have something
criminal to hide. In a period of extreme public sensitivity to crime like the present, many in the
community tend to regard the Fourth Amendment
simply as a refuge for felons. Even when privacy
values in criminal justice administration are identified and it is recognized that a police establishment
ignorant of and hostile to such values constitutes, in
the long run, a peril to the entire community, the
claims of privacy may be perceived as weak, speculative, and remote when compared to the insistent
demands of law enforcement.
Vigorous judicial enforcement of privacy values is
also inhibited by the fact that courts are agencies
of government and under constraint to permit legislatures and administrative personnel to perform, and
within limits to define, their own functions . Once the
legislature initiates a penal policy that, for example,
criminalizes the use of drugs and alcohol, gambling,
and certain forms of sexual expression, the courts will
often respond by conceding authority to the enforcement agencies to perform their difficult duties; the
concessions tend toward the limitation of constitutional inhibitions on governmental action. However
persuasive the case for contemporary penal policy
in these areas, the fact, plainly stated, is that it has
substantially constricted the boundaries of the private
world in American society.
The implications of these developments are more
somber than is sometimes understood. A contagion
effect sets in. Attitudes formed in the context of
counterespionage or organized crime are readily
transmittable to surveillance of the activities of politically suspect groups or even of political rivals.
Watergate taught us that.
Sometimes, in responding to the exigent claims of
law enforcement, the courts, with insufficient awareness, appear willing to open wide the gates of the
private world to state power. In the famous "pen
register" case, a prevailing majority of the present
Supreme Court held that the government, without a
warrant, may acquire evidence of the phone numbers
dialed by a suspected person, apparently on the
ground that because the caller necessarily discloses
this information to the telephone company it cannot
be deemed private. 5 Yet in an interdependent technological society one cannot function, or even survive,
without a plethora of limited disclosures. If the tendency of this decision continues and if, as against
government, the citizen is not permitted to maintain
the limitations on his limited disclosures, then we
shall have ceded an enormous tract of the private
world to uninhibited state scrutiny.
The canvass of dilemmas and difficulties encountered in the legal experience does not and is not
intended to suggest that the record of the law in
defining and protecting the limits of the private
world is simply one of waste and futility. In Oceania
there is no law, and maintenance of the values of

human individuality is hardly conceivable without it.
Yet if the private world is to have meaning in the
postmodern age, we must be disabused of the notion
that all that is required of us is to permit the law to
undertake its initiatives and pursue its objectives.
The law ultimately reflects the struggle of interests
and values going forward in society, and the future
of law is one of the interests at stake in the struggle.
That there are dimensions to the social and ethical
issues in dispute that transcend the merely legal is
best demonstrated by a scrutiny of the legal experience itself.

II
G

iven a political society as intent as Oceania's to
blot out the past, it is perhaps not surprising that
the reader of the novel is left in doubt about how the
regime, firmly ensconced in Winston Smith's day,
had established itself. Orwell tells us only a little
about the events that led to the reality of 1984.
Although the history of the previous half-century is
shadowy, one deduces that Oceania did not emerge
from an established Hitler-like or Stalin-like dictatorship. Rather it appears in some way to have evolved
principally from the Western capitalist societies of
Britain and the United States. One suspects that a
warning is being issued here, and the suspicion is
strengthened when Orwell is found writing in "The
Prevention of Literature," one of his best-known late
essays: "In our age, the idea of intellectual liberty is
under attack from two directions. On the one side are
its theoretical enemies, the apologists of totalitarianism, and on the other its immediate, practical
enemies, monopoly and bureaucracy."
The notion that the modern threat to individual
autonomy and the other values fostered by the private world comes not alone or, even, principally from
the state, but rather from society itself, has been frequently advanced in the recent past. The great
dichotomy is not that of public and private; it is that
of the social and the private. In short, it is modern
culture that subverts the private world, and, according to some who have addressed the question, the
true issue is how the grip of society can be eased or
the culture overthrown.
Before proceeding with a consideration of this
argument and the evidence invoked to support it,
one preliminary matter requires attention. Either as a
political tactic or as a rhetorical embellishment, some
who attack Western society as depersonalizing and,
hence, as dehumanizing, have argued that the true
enemy of the private world is not the state and that
the defenders of that world need not maintain their

It might be thought
that, given the
importance of the
private ·world to
the most fundamental liberal
values, the onus
of proof should be
placed on those
who seek to justify invasions of the
private realm on the ground that
larger social interests are being
served. In many areas of American
la'lu and policy precisely the
opposite presumption is being
applied.
traditional wariness of state intrusion. Such assurances convey no conviction and deserve no credit.
Any governmental organism commanding the sorts of
electronic and computer technology that are available
today in all developed nations must be regarded not
simply as a potential but as an active antagonist of
the private world. We shall ill serve our vital interests
if in our haste to indict Western culture we underestimate the current massive and burgeoning threat of
state power.
Yet one need not assume the diminishment of the
political threat to recognize the force of the argument
of those who indict modern culture for its devastating
effects in the private realm. According to the picture
drawn, the inhabitants of the Western world with
its mass media, mindless popular entertainment, and
advertising, are being manipulated and conditioned,
not in the fashion of Oceania's tyrannical rule over
party members like Winston Smith and Julia, but
rather in a manner closer to its handling of the lower
orders of society, the proles.
In Nineteen Eighty-Four the telescreen that may be
dimmed but never turned off constitutes a primary
symbol of the state's intrusions into the private lives
of its subjects. Yet how great are the differences
between such a society and one in which persons
who because of cultural constraints, loneliness, apathy, and diminished sense of personhood, can never
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There is irony and danger
in the fact that a strategy
for defense of the private world
necessitates struggle in the public
arena.
bring themselves to turn off the television set? And
what is seen on television may often consist of education in the devaluation of privacy. Much of its
"harmless entertainment" consists of revelations into
the intimate lives of media personages. If, even with
their complicity, we scrutinize the lives of public
personalities as if they were animals in a zoo, have
we not suffered losses in human dignity of all persons and reduced the value of privacy in our own
lives?
Other expressions of the policy of Oceania have
been identified in contemporary Western society. We
are developing, some have said, our own versions
of Newspeak. Thus, Herbet Marcuse argued that the
technological culture promotes a language of overwhelming concreteness, highly functional in
character, ill-adapted to conceptual thinking, and
discouraging to criticism and evaluation. Perhaps of
more immediate concern is our apparent inability
to inculcate language facility of any sort in many of
our young. Because it has become familiar, it no
longer startles us that it is possible for young persons
to complete their studies in what are ostensibly the
great universities without gaining a command of
language above the levels of technical literacy and
without acquiring sufficient understanding of language to respect it. Such persons are deprived of
a capacity essential to autonomy, and lack adequate
defenses against the aggressive inroads of political
propaganda and cultural imperatives into their private worlds.
It is argued by critics on the right that the very
assumptions of a liberal society unleash the assaults
of popular culture on certain vital aspects of privacy.
The unrestrained license of speech and publication
mandated by that society denies refuges and living
space free from recurrent manifestations of overt sexuality to individuals and families desiring such
freedom . Even the huckstering of hammers and saws
takes place in a synthetic atmosphere of blatant sensuality, even the sale of candy bars to children. These
phenomena are importantly implicated in the rise of
political activism within fundamentalist religious
groups. Their aggressive political program may rest
less on optimism about the redemption of American
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society than on a determination to make effective
their separation from the moral contaminations of
society. It reflects a purpose to construct areas of privacy for themselves, however destructive the agenda
may be to the autonomy and privacy of persons committed to different values and perceptions. The liberal
society thus creates its own enemies and provides
them with their most effective weapons.
The critique of modem culture is many faceted, but
the overarching allegation is that it produces human
beings crippled in character and personality, incapable of autonomy, lacking in identity, leading lives
of despair, and prone to violence. One recalls a recent
rash of instances of persons falsely claiming to have
found dangerous foreign objects in packaged food
and drugs. Most often, motivation for the claims
appeared to include a thirst for attention, a craving
for an identity created by a minute's exposure before
a television camera. If it is argued that the behavior
is merely that of a lunatic fringe, the answer is that
the form a society's lunacy takes may have much
to say about the attributes of the prevailing culture.
The tendency in American society to identify fame
with notoriety is surely not one confined to an eccentric few. There is reason to suspect that the tendency
points to a weakening of the sense of self, a shrinking of what Erickson calls "ego identity": in short,
a condition in many persons that renders the concept
of the private world unfathomable and ultimately
frightening.
In an almost perfect phrase, Montaigne asserted
that "a man must flee from the popular conditions
that have taken possession of his soul." It is hard
advice. Given the force of the intrusions in the modem world, both those launched by the state and also
those created by the prevailing culture, where is the
man to flee? And, even more difficult, how may the
"popular conditions" be altered and made less threatening to his private realm? In much of the current
literature, especially that coming from the left, a
strong note of fatalism is sounded about the capacity
of Western society to cure itself. That society, it is
asserted, is impotent to confront the drift toward
destruction of the private worlds by measures short
of an overturning of social institutions and a complete recasting of social, political, and economic
relations. If the prescription is rejected, then inevitably the Western world will keep its rendezvous with
the cold day in April when the clocks are striking
thirteen.
It is a somber forecast and one sufficiently buttressed by evidences and omens to be taken
seriously. Yet the diagnosis and prescription are
hardly disinterested. The cure proposed, moreover,
may prove more virulent than the disease. Still, troubling questions persist: Is Western society any longer
capable of producing and nourishing an individualism appropriate to the times? Will it prove able to
hold back the threatened eclipse of the private
worlds?

There may, indeed, be reason to hope that, despite
evidences of decay, Western individualism is a hardier plant and its roots more firmly anchored than
the critics of the modem state and contemporary culture allow. The values of human autonomy and
uniqueness are susceptible of many forms of expression. Manifestations of the ideals that emerged in the
early decades of the Industrial Revolution do not represent their only possible expressions. The rejection
or modification of some earlier manifestations does
not necessarily entail surrender of the values
themselves.
The critical issues in the defense of the private
world may prove to be questions of will and strategy.
There is evidence that the desire to promote and
defend some privacy interests has waned. But not all
the evidence points in the same direction.
In the course of the past two decades a stronger
outcry than ever before has been raised against certain intrusions into the private realm. The
widespread protest against subliminal advertising
supplies one illustration. A proliferation of statutory
enactments dealing with a broad spectrum of privacy
intrusions and a plethora of judicial decisions concerning related issues provide other examples.
It is true, of course, that the growing public sensitivity to at least some privacy issues and the reaction
of legislatures and courts may itself constitute evidence of increasing and intensified assaults against
the private world in the United States. The burgeoning of law relating to the rights of individuals is
indicative of a crisis of liberty that has persistently
afflicted the Western world since the First World War.
But if modern concerns reflect an ominous challenge
to the private world, they are also part of a defensive
response . And response is vital to any hope that
Oceania is not to be the ultimate destination of Western society.
There is irony and danger in the fact that a strategy
for defense of the private world necessitates struggle
in the public arena. Such a strategy necessarily entails
more than the framing and enforcement of legal measures, but the existence of enforceable rights
constitutes a vital part of it. The rise of electronic and
computer technology and their ready availability to
government and private business groups enormously
complicates the devising of strategy. The private
world lies continuously under the shadow of power
capable of being used for invading and obliterating
the private realm. These exigencies, however, provide
opportunities for the creation of policy. We are
unable to eliminate such threats, but there are ample
occasions for mandating uses of technology that
minimize, instead of magnify, interferences with private lives.
Nor should one overlook the importance of the
judicial and legislative defense of privacy values in
the development of personal attitudes. Learned Hand
once suggested that the freedoms of the First Amendment thrive only among a people capable of valuing

them. Yet it is also true that debates on freedomof-speech issues in the Supreme Court since 1917
have done much to educate public attitudes and that
modern support of the values springs in important
part from the advocacy of great judges, sometimes
expressed in dissent. 6 So also, adjudication of interests vital to the private world may contribute to the
formation of a vigorous public opinion and hence
produce effects going far beyond the particular issues
adjudicated .
Yet there are limits on what may be demanded or
expected from law and public policy. It is surely not
paradoxical that the survival or loss of the privacy
value depends most importantly on what is done by
individuals in their private lives. What is done may,
in turn, depend importantly on how well institutions
dedicated to cultivation of the life of the mind and
to aesthetic sensibility perform their tasks, and
whether those efforts can escape submersion in the
mindlessness this society spawns .
There are no guarantees. The case
for hope is an uneasy one, but this is
a time when all liberal hopes rest on
uneasy premises. As this becomes
increasingly clear, many persons
will return to Nineteen Eighty-Four
to be reminded of what is at stake.
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